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Abstract: Ever since the inception of the United Nations climate regime in the early 1990s, 
the European Union has aspired to play a leading part in the global combat against climate 
change. Based on an analysis of how the Union has developed its foreign climate policy to 
fulfil this role over the past two decades, the paper sets out to identify the reasons for this 
evolution.  It  demonstrates  that  the  EU‟s  development  in  this  area  was  co-determined  by 
adaptations to shifting international dynamics strongly bounded by purely domestic concerns. 
Providing  a  concise  understanding  and  explanation  of  how  the  Union  designs  its  foreign 
policy  with  regard  to  one  emblematic  issue  of  its  international  activity,  the  contribution 
provides insights into the remarkably rapid, but not always effective maturation of this unique 
actor‟s involvement in (non-Common Foreign and Security Policy) global politics. 
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Introduction 
For two decades since the onset of the first official negotiations, in 1991, on what would later 
become  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC),  the 
global  community  has  attempted  to  design  stringent  political  solutions  to the  problem  of 
climate change. During this entire period, the European Union (EU)
1 has been among the 
most active players in the negotiations, constantly seeking to provide leadership to the process 
(Oberthür 2009).  Despite this dedication, the modalities of its activities in global climate 
politics evolved considerably across time. 
While the Union‟s  historical evolution as a  foreign policy player has  been the  subject of 
scholarly debate in general - descriptive-analytical and theoretical - terms (Carlsnaes 2007), 
the analysis of its foreign policy activities in specific domains, notably also in the area of 
climate change, has remained more limited. This is a regrettable research gap because much 
can be learned about the nature of EU integration from examining its foreign policy in various 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  (CFSP)  and  non-CFSP  domains,  which  are  traditionally 
among the hardest policy areas to integrate. When it comes to the issue of climate change, one 
would assume that there is a strong rationale for greater integration, however. There is no 
point whatsoever in "going it alone" when tackling this collective action problem. Internally, 
the  EU  member  states'  climate  change  policies  have  therefore  already  been  harmonized 
substantially. With regard to the EU's external activities on climate change, by contrast, the 
jury is still out. For that reason, and as climate change poses a policy challenge that can be 
regarded  as  an  example  of  a  whole  set of  similar  EU  external  policies,  especially  in  the 
environmental area, investigating into this case will help to fill the above-mentioned research 
gap. To this end, the present contribution addresses two closely linked research questions – 
one with an empirical objective and a second one aimed at explaining trends in EU foreign 
policy development. 
In empirical terms, the study of the EU‟s external climate policy has most notably suffered 
from a “presentism bias” (Jørgensen 2007: 510). Although the Union‟s implication in the 
evolution of the climate regime  has been  examined  for different phases (e.g. 1995-1997), 
particularly  with  the  help  of  the  concept  of  “leadership”  (e.g.  Gupta/Grubb  2000),  a 
longitudinal perspective on its development as a foreign climate policy player has hardly been 
adopted  (see,  however,  Jordan/Rayner  2010,  with  their  discussion  of  the  EU‟s  internal 
climate policy evolution). Moreover, studies have tended to concentrate very much on the 
Union‟s climate foreign policy making, i.e. the internal preparation of its negotiation positions 
in specific contexts, in an effort to understand EU leadership ambitions (Oberthür 2009; Costa 
                                                 
 
1 In the early 1990s, today‟s EU was still the European Community (EC). To be consistent, current custom is 
followed by continuously referring to the European Union in this contribution, unless legal accuracy demands 
otherwise.  EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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2009a). Its foreign policy  implementation
2 - the activities  it actually undertakes to get its 
positions adopted internationally (cf. Brighi/Hill 2008) - has, by contrast, received very little 
attention. A two-fold empirical research gap therefore exists, which is characteristic of much 
of the literature on EU foreign policy more widely. Its closing demands the adoption of a 
longitudinal approach that traces the development of the Union‟s foreign policy by focussing 
not only on the making, but explicitly also on the implementation of this latter. The article 
intends to fill this void by first replying to the following question: how has the EU’s foreign 
climate policy developed over the past 20 years?  
The purpose of this contribution goes, however, beyond the - in itself already interesting and 
novel - empirical exercise of mapping the evolution of EU foreign climate policy over time. 
The better understanding gained by adopting a longitudinal perspective and zooming in on the 
EU‟s  actual  behaviour  in  foreign  climate  policy  provides  the  necessary  basis  for  an 
explanatory  exercise  of  this  evolution  that  transcends  the  state  of  the  art.  To  attain  this 
objective, the article addresses a second question: why has the EU’s foreign climate policy 
developed the way it did? To date, efforts to account for EU external policy in the climate 
domain  have  been  largely  in  line  with  general  explanations  of  European  foreign  policy, 
focussing on single levels of analysis (the international, the EU) and/or the sole explanandum 
foreign policy making. The general EU foreign policy literature recurrently operates with two 
types of explanations for the development of the Union‟s foreign policy: (i) those drawing on 
variables related to the global context, notably economic interdependencies, and (ii) others 
operating with domestic variables (Hix/Hoyland 2011: 323-330). With regard to the domestic 
variables,  two  alternative  accounts  are  regularly  distinguished:  rational  choice  and  liberal 
intergovernmentalist theorists argue that member states‟ geopolitical and economic interests 
decisively  determine  the  shape  of  EU  foreign  policy    (Hix/Hoyland  2011:  325-328; 
Moravcsik  1998:  3-10),  while  scholars  of  supranationalism  invoke  internal  institutional 
constellations and especially the role of supranational players as determinants of the Union‟s 
foreign policy choices (Hix/Hoyland 2011: 328-330).  
This general debate, which tends to be held at quite a high level of aggregation, has also 
strongly influenced the search for explanations of EU external environmental and - notably - 
climate policy. Some authors explain the Union‟s foreign environmental and climate policy 
making from predominantly a rational choice perspective, at times combining variables at two 
levels  of  analysis  (Kelemen/Vogel  2010,  Schreurs/Tiberghien  2007).  Kelemen  and  Vogel 
(2010: 437), for instance, argue “that an account rooted in political economy - focusing on the 
interaction between domestic politics and international regulatory competition - provides” a 
powerful  explanation  for  EU  environmental  (including  climate)  leadership.  Others  have 
focussed on purely domestic factors, and here most notably on the EU‟s institutional capacity 
                                                 
 
2  The  term  “implementation”  often  has  a  purely  technical  connotation  (e.g.  the  implementation  of  an  aid 
programme) and can therefore be slightly misleading. Although other terms like “foreign policy behaviour” 
would be preferable, the notion of implementation is retained in this paper because it represents an established 
analytical concept in foreign policy analysis. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm      5 
 
and  internal  policies  as  bases  for  providing  leadership  to  global  environmental  processes 
(Oberthür 2009; Wurzel/Connelly 2010; Costa 2009a, 2009b). In the debate on EU external 
climate policy, this latter approach, which tries to understand “who exercises what kind of 
leadership, how and when” has become the mainstream of sorts (Wurzel/Connelly 2010: 15; 
Oberthür  2009;  Lindenthal  2009;  Gupta/Grubb  2000).  While  this  strand  in  the  literature 
strives to untangle the complex internal factors leading the EU to adopt a leadership position, 
it represents a conceptual rather than an explanatory account of EU foreign policy making. 
Moreover, it tends to neglect the importance of the external context the Union is embedded 
into.  Both  approaches  remain  strongly  rooted  in  rational  choice-inspired  explanations 
focussing on the EU‟s policy making. 
While acknowledging the important explanatory attempts undertaken through the prisms of 
these two general, theoretical and conceptual approaches, this article aims to go a step further 
in two respects: first, by broadening the explanandum to the EU´s foreign policy behaviour in 
the  climate  change  domain,  as  it  considers  that  there  is  a  difference  between  adopting  a 
foreign policy position and acting it out (Brighi/Hill 2008); and, second, by focussing on the 
interplay  between  internal  and  external  factors  in  their  multiplicity.  By  extending  the 
explanatory  effort  to  its  actual  foreign  policy  implementation,  the  resulting  explanation 
represents  a  promising  variation  of  typical  foreign  policy  analyses.  If  the  formulation  of 
common foreign policy positions regularly represents a significant challenge for the EU, their 
joint  implementation  necessitates  the  even  more  intricate  coordination  of  member  states‟ 
often long-standing foreign policy strategies, constituting thus a very complex and sensitive 
matter - and potential boundary - of European integration. Insights may therefore be gained 
from this case into the limits of EU integration in the domain of (non-CFSP) foreign policy 
more generally. Any explanation of the institutionalization processes regarding the Union‟s 
foreign policy making and implementation calls for a combination of theoretical approaches 
to EU integration that descends from the high level of aggregation at which the broad macro-
theories - which dominate both EU integration studies and the explanation of EU foreign 
policy developments - are held (Wiener/Diez 2009). At the same time, it needs to remain open 
for possible  impacts of developments in global  politics, which can  be significant external 
determinants of the EU‟s foreign policy activities. To this end, the contribution operates with 
middle-range, neo-institutionalist theories of EU integration, which it combines with variables 
derived from the external context.  
The main intention pursued with this contribution lies thus in advancing scholarly thinking on 
the dynamics of European integration in the field of a major (non-CFSP) foreign policy issue 
more generally (theoretical gap), while shedding light on the Union‟s historical evolution as a 
foreign policy player in the important field of global climate politics (empirical gap). Where 
the longitudinal case approach provides novel insights into the topic, it also paves the way for 
designing a tentative explanation of long-term trends, which challenges the view that the EU 
continuously adopts a leadership approach because it considers that it best suits its strategic 
interests in the face of an intricate external context. The findings have important implications 
for the design of future policies in the climate change as in other domains of EU foreign 
policy. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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The analysis proceeds in four main steps. Following a brief presentation of the conceptual and 
theoretical  bases  for understanding and explaining EU foreign policy, a narrative  form of 
process-tracing focuses on the historical evolution of the Union‟s foreign climate policy from 
1991  to  2009  and  the  Copenhagen  summit.  Distinguishing  between  four  time  phases,  it 
examines the EU‟s foreign policy making and implementation, as well as the context provided 
by global climate politics. This descriptive analysis allows for the identification of cross-time 
patterns in the Union‟s foreign climate policy, which are subsequently explained through a 
combination  of  considerations  derived  from  middle-range  EU  integration  theories.  The 
contribution closes with an appreciation of what the findings mean for the study and practical 
effectiveness of the EU‟s foreign policy in the analysed and similar domains of non-CFSP 
foreign policy.  
1.  Conceptual and theoretical bases:  
EU foreign policy and the logic of its evolution 
The empirical analysis of the evolution of EU foreign policy firstly requires a clear conceptual 
vision  of  what  this  foreign  policy  precisely  entails  and  how  it  can  be  analysed.  When 
embedded into theoretical considerations, the advanced concepts also provide the ground for 
an  explanation  of  the  evolutionary  paths  of  the  Union‟s  foreign  policy  making  and 
implementation. 
1.1.  EU foreign policy: What it is and how to analyse it 
EU foreign policy is not fundamentally different from foreign policy as conducted by a state. 
It is “that area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the objective of 
influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue 
interests, values and goals” (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 19). The key difference between 
the two concerns the actors who define and conduct such a foreign policy. European Union 
foreign  policy  is  at  play  whenever  EU  actors  (the  European  Commission,  the  Council 
Presidency)  or  EU  member  states  act  explicitly  on  behalf  of  or  in  line  with  EU  values, 
interests and goals (Smith 2003: 2).  
When it comes to analysing foreign policy, be it of a state or the EU, a useful distinction can 
be made between foreign policy making and foreign policy implementation. Foreign policy 
making has classically been defined as “the process which results in the selection from a (…) 
number  of  (…)  projects  of  one  project  intended  to  bring  about  the  (…)  state  of  affairs 
envisaged by the decision-makers” (Snyder et al. 1962: 90). Analysts of foreign policy have 
typically concentrated on understanding and explaining how this “one project” was chosen, 
implicitly assuming that the foreign policy “outputs”  - in the form of positions adopted - 
would then be “self-executing” (Garrison 2003: 155; Hudson/Vore 1995; Brighi/Hill 2008: 
127,  134;  Smith/Clarke  1985).  Comparatively  little  attention  has  therefore  been  paid  to EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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foreign  policy  implementation,  which  depicts  actors‟  activities  when  they  “confront  their 
environment and (…) the environment confronts them” and marks the step in the foreign 
policy process “in which decisions are translated into actions” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 117, 118). 
Although the two are obviously closely linked, focusing on this latter dimension of an actor‟s 
foreign policy acknowledges that discrepancies between  what an actor intends to do in its 
relations with the external world (foreign policy making) and what it actually does and how 
(foreign  policy  implementation)  must  be  considered  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception 
(Brighi/Hill  2008).  The  notion  of  foreign  policy  implementation  underscores  therefore  an 
actor‟s strategic agency potential in global politics (Clarke/Smith 1985: 166). 
By consequence, any comprehensive mapping of an actor‟s foreign policy over time needs to 
pay attention to both these analytical dimensions and their interplay. As foreign policy  is 
never made or implemented in a vacuum, it is, moreover, important to give consideration to 
the external context, i.e. the institutional structures and actor constellations it is geared toward 
and embedded into (Brighi/Hill 2008). Consequently, while focussing on the understudied 
dimension of implementation, the study explores the following key analytical units of foreign 
policy analysis:  
1.  EU foreign policy making and global climate politics: how does EU foreign climate 
policy decision-making function? Which actors are involved, what is the overarching 
rationale? Which central positions does the EU defend? Who are the key actors, what 
are their positions and what are the central issues and cleavages in global climate 
politics?  
2.  EU  foreign  policy  implementation:  who  represents  the  EU  and  how  does  this 
representation  function?  How  does  the  Union  defend  its  positions  strategically? 
Which instruments (diplomatic, economic)
3 does it employ vis-à-vis external actors? 
Results  will  be  presented  in  the  form  of  a  longitudinal  case  study  providing  a  narrative 
process-trace that covers these components. Process-tracing is nowadays ubiquitous in social 
science methodology, but hardly ever operationalized (see, however, Bennett/George 2005; 
Gerring 2007: chapt. 7). In a positivist understanding, it involves the attempt “to identify the 
intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between (…)  independent 
(…) variables and the outcome of the dependent variable” (Bennett/George 2005: 206-207). 
While the overarching logic of uncovering the causal chain remains the same in the interpretive 
variant of the method privileged here, process-tracing is essentially regarded as narration in 
search for patterns (Gysen et al. 2006). The narrative process-trace provided in this article 
gives  an  account  of  events  as  they  unfolded,  while  being  causal  in  nature  because  “any 
explanation resides in its accounting for temporality and sequence” (Somers 1998: 771). This 
                                                 
 
3  K.  Smith  developed  a  useful  catalogue  of  EU  foreign  policy  instruments,  which  distinguishes  between 
economic and diplomatic tools (2003: 52-68). Diplomatic instruments include issuing demarches or declarations, 
visiting other countries, opening dialogues etc. In the economic sphere, the EU can inter alia suspend/conclude 
trade or association agreements, reduce/increase its tariffs or provide/withdraw aid. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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allows for extracting patterns over time, and for subsequent "pattern-matching", as explained 
in the next section. 
1.2.  How to explain the evolution of EU foreign climate policy 
Describing the evolution of the EU‟s foreign climate policy represents one valuable portion of 
this  contribution,  but  its  intention  lies  furthermore  in  extracting  cross-time  patterns  and 
explaining the development of its foreign policy making and, notably, implementation, as a 
currently under-studied dimension of its external climate activities. 
Generally,  and  expanding  upon  the  brief  overview  of  the  academic  debate  on  EU 
environmental and climate leadership provided in the introduction to this contribution, one 
can  assume  that  this  evolution  is  co-determined  by  factors  operating  at  three  levels:  the 
international, the European and the national (Brighi/Hill 2008). Recently, scholars have begun 
to  apply  “second  image  reversed”  arguments  to  explain  external  influences  on  the  EU‟s 
climate  policy  (Costa  2009b),  granting  the  international  policy  level  an  incentivizing  or 
constraining role. International institutions can empower certain “change agents” or lead to 
preference modifications of some actors at the EU level, but EU policies are then adjusted to 
the external environment via a collective internal reaction (Costa 2009b: 74-78). In similar 
vein, the national level does not by itself determine the choice for a specific EU foreign policy 
behaviour. While certain member states might play a stronger role than others in shaping EU 
policies, states‟ preferences only take effect at the aggregate, European level. This level must 
therefore be considered as central to understanding the evolutionary dynamics of EU foreign 
policy,  while  an  eye  needs  to  be  kept  out  to  the  input  of  member  states  as  well  as  to 
institutions,  actors  and  their  interests  and  power  at  the  global  level,  which  may 
prompt/prevent change in the Union.  
If one focuses on this central level of analysis, the evolution of EU foreign policy may best be 
explained by having recourse to theories of EU integration, which attempt to uncover and 
explain the processes and outcomes of the Union‟s development as an entity. Several different 
strands of EU integration theory come into consideration. To begin with, the broad meta-
theories embodied in (neo)functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism could provide first 
ideas on how to explain the development of EU foreign policy in the climate domain. Where 
liberal intergovernmentalists regard state interactions based on the rational defence of national 
interests as the key determinants of the  Union‟s evolution as  an entity,  neo-functionalists 
highlight the role of supranational institutions and spill-over effects in this development (see, 
e.g.,  Moravcsik  1998;  Sandholtz  and  Stone  Sweet  1998).  Both  are,  however,  rightly 
considered to represent “grand theory” about what Peterson and Bomberg have called “super-
systemic  decisions”,  i.e.  “history-making”  choices  on  the  shape  of  the  EU  and  its 
constitutional/institutional  nature  as  such  (1999:  9).  Their  performance  in  explaining 
evolutions  in  specific  policy  fields  can  therefore  be  contested  (Risse  1996:  59).  For that 
reason, and since the purpose of this study is to explain the development of foreign policy 
behaviour in one domain of EU external policies over time, middle-range integration theories EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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seem  to  provide  more  promising  starting  points  for  the  intended  analysis 
(Aspinwall/Schneider 2000). These theories, again according to Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 
9), focus on “systemic decisions”, i.e. policy content in particular areas, and are thus also able 
to  help  understanding  and  explaining  evolutions  in  this  content  over  time.  Given  the 
complexity of EU integration processes, it has been suggested to combine these theoretical 
approaches  so  as  to  compose  a  “mosaic”  of  complementary  theoretical  perspectives 
(Diez/Wiener  2009).  Essentially,  change  over  time  in  EU  foreign  climate  policy  can  be 
explained  via  any  (or  a  combination  of)  three  key  approaches  to  processes  of 
institutionalization within Europe (Pollack 2009; Aspinwall/Schneider 2000: 7). Such a policy 
area can develop 
1.  as the result of repeated rounds of bargaining among member states,  which decide 
whether a policy should be maintained or altered (rational choice institutionalism) 
(Pollack 2009: 126),  
2.  in the form of “bounded change” in line with a logic of path-dependency: existing 
institutions,  i.e.  “formal  and  informal  structures  that  influence  human  behaviour” 
within the EU, set policies on certain, not necessarily efficient tracks, which restrain 
member states‟ choices and can only  be  left at high cost or at “critical  junctures” 
(historical institutionalism) (Aspinwall/Schneider 2000: 4; Pierson 2000: 265), or  
3.  as a result of cognitive processes of adaptation to certain norms: the preferences and 
behaviour  of  actors  in  the  EU  are  shaped  “through  interaction  with  broader 
institutional contexts (norms and discursive structures)” and the internalization of the 
latter  in  line  with  the  “logic  of  appropriateness”  (sociological  institutionalism) 
(Checkel 1999: 6; Risse 2009).
4  
Each of these theoretical approaches holds a distinct conception of the role the external 
environment can play in the Union‟s development as a (foreign) policy actor. In the rationalist 
view,  this  environment  can  be  a  source  of  member  states‟  preference  change,  but  it  is 
nonetheless through internal bargaining processes that policies are developed. In the historical 
institutionalist view, the external environment plays a rather limited role during periods of 
path-dependent  policy  evolution,  but  can  provide  for  external  shocks  that  can  trigger  a 
“critical  juncture”,  at  which  policies  are  reformed  and  set on  new  tracks  (Pierson  2000). 
Finally, sociological institutionalists attribute a fairly significant role to the external context a 
foreign policy actor operates in, as international norms can - over time - come to determine 
the EU‟s collective identity, preferences and, ultimately, behaviour.  
                                                 
 
4  Note  that  the notion  of  socialisation  processes  is  also  inherent in  many  neo-functionalist accounts  of  EU 
integration. Yet, as neo-functionalism represents a rather complex theoretical edifice with a set of assumptions 
that, as argued above, are more suited for explaining history-making decisions in the EU, preference is given to 
operating with mid-range integration theories here. When explaining the evolution of policy content over time, 
these latter can more convincingly be combined inter se. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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The  intention  pursued  with  this  contribution  is  not  to  formally  test  any  of  these  well-
established theoretical strands, but to interpret the data gathered in the narrative process-trace 
in light of these approaches in order to tentatively explain the evolutionary dynamics of EU 
foreign  climate  policy.  In  case  study  research,  this  technique  is  frequently  referred  to  as 
“pattern-matching”:  systematically  produced  empirical  observations  are  compared  to  the 
expectations  formulated  on  the  basis  of  theories  (Yin  2003).  The  resulting  explanation 
regularly  involves  a  combination  of  different  logics,  as  “it  is  not  obvious  that  any  one 
approach  is superior to the others  in capturing the complexities of change” (March/Olsen 
1998: 21). It is to be regarded as a plausible account of the evolutionary logic of EU foreign 
climate policy, and thus a contribution to an ongoing debate, derived from a novel approach 
to studying the subject. 
2.  Empirical analysis:  
The evolution of the EU’s foreign climate policy (1991-2009) 
The  longitudinal  analysis  of  the  EU‟s  foreign  climate  policy  is  dissected  into  four  time 
periods, selected on the basis of the different stages of UN climate regime development. The 
research for the different periods presented here is based on a larger study which involved a 
triangulation of research techniques and sources including 32 semi-structured interviews, the 
analysis  of  selected  EU,  EU  member  state  and  UN  documents  and  the  non-participatory 
observation of the Union‟s activities at UN climate negotiation sessions during the year 2009. 
The research interviews were conducted between January 2008 and March 2010 with former 
and current climate negotiators from the European Commission, from several EU member 
states  (including  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Portugal  and  the  UK)  and  from  non-EU 
countries  (e.g.  USA,  South  Africa)  as  well  as  with  observers  of  EU  and  global  climate 
politics. Interviewees were asked about their perceptions of the activities, role and impact of 
the EU in global climate politics and its evolution over time. Their answers were coded and 
used to develop the narrative process-trace. Interview research was complementary to wide-
reaching document analysis of primary sources including UN, EU and EU member states 
official  (negotiation  texts,  compilations  of  party  positions  etc.)  and  unofficial  negotiation 
documents (position papers, negotiation syntheses etc.) as well as academic and other reports 
of  key  global  climate  negotiations  sessions.  Sources  were  selected  on  the  basis  of  their 
salience for the understanding of the EU's foreign policy behaviour. For the final round of 
negotiations  analyzed  in  this  paper,  the  author  could  also  benefit  from  direct,  non-
participatory observation of preparatory UN negotiation sessions in Bonn (8-12 June 2009) 
and  Barcelona (2-6 November 2009) as well as during the  15
th conference of the parties 
(COP) in Copenhagen (8-19 December 2009). As a party delegate, the author had access to all 
major formal and numerous informal negotiation settings, allowing for a close monitoring of 
EU activities and interactions with other players in global climate politics. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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2.1.  Creating the UN climate regime: EU ad hoc coordination on the way to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1991-1992) 
In 1990, climate change made a decisive leap from scientific circles onto political agendas 
when the UN General Assembly created the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) 
to finalize deliberations on a climate treaty by the June 1992 Rio Earth summit (Pallemaerts 
2004) (for an overview of major UN climate negotiation sessions between 1991 and 2011, see 
Table 1). 
EU foreign policy making and global climate politics 
EU foreign policy making on climate change concentrated on the coordination of member 
state positions during this period.  As  early  as June 1990, a European Council  summit  in 
Dublin had called upon the Union to accept “a wider responsibility (…) to play a leading role 
in  promoting  concerted  and  effective  action  at  global  level”  regarding  environmental 
problems (European Council 1990: Annex II). This call would set the tone for the Union‟s 
position for the years to come. It was translated into a specific commitment later that year 
when the Council decided that the EU should stabilize its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at 
1990 levels by 2000 (Brambilla 2004: 247). 
In the global arena, the EU formed part of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which acted as a loose negotiation block vis-à-vis the Group of 77 and 
China  (G-77/China)  coalition  of  developing  countries.  While  key  parties  within  both 
coalitions agreed on the necessity to negotiate a treaty, they diverged on whether it should 
incorporate legally binding emission reduction obligations and which magnitude the relevant 
targets should take (Bodansky 1993). The large majority of OECD parties and the developing 
world favoured a legally binding approach, which was, however, refuted by the US. Many 
industrialized countries, including EU members and Canada, but not the US, had moreover 
openly pledged a stabilization of emissions by the year 2000 (Paterson/Grubb 1992: 301). In 
this  context,  developing  countries  called  on  the  developed  world  to  substantially  reduce 
emissions and provide technological and financial aid to help the poor in their combat against 
climate change (Bodansky 1993: 479-480). Compromises between these groups of parties led 
to the following, not legally binding key provisions: the objective of the regime as such was 
“to achieve (…) stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Art. 2 
UNFCCC), while industrialized parties were strongly incited to return “individually or jointly 
to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions” (Art. 4.2(b) UNFCCC) in the future. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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Table 1: Major UN climate negotiation sessions between 1991 and 2011 
Period  Meeting  Dates  Places 
1991-1992  INC 1 - 5.2 
February,  June,  Sept.,  Dec. 
1991; February, May 1992 
Chantilly 
(USA), Geneva, 
Nairobi, New 
York 
1993-1997 
INC 6-11 
Dec.  1992,  March,  August 
1993;  
Feb.,  Sept.  1994;  February 
1995 
Geneva 
New York 
COP 1  28 March-7 April 1995  Berlin 
COP 2  8-19 July 1996  Geneva 
COP 3  1-11 Dec. 1997  Kyoto 
1998-2004 
COP 4  2-13 Nov. 1998  Buenos Aires 
COP 5  25 Oct.-5 Nov. 1999  Bonn 
COP 6  13-25 Nov. 2000  The Hague 
COP 6bis  16-27 July 2001  Bonn 
COP 7  29 Oct.-10 Nov. 2001  Marrakech 
COP 8  23 Oct.-1 Nov. 2002  New Delhi 
COP 9  1-12 Dec. 2003  Milan 
COP 10  6-18 Dec. 2004  Buenos Aires 
2005-2011 
COP 11/MOP 1  28 Nov.-10 Dec. 2005  Montreal 
COP 12/MOP 2  5-17 Nov. 2006  Nairobi 
COP 13/MOP 3  3-15 Dec. 2007  Bali 
COP 14/MOP 4  2-13 Dec. 2008  Poznan 
COP 15/MOP 5  7-19 Dec. 2009  Copenhagen 
COP 16/MOP 6  29 Nov.-10 Dec. 2010  Cancun, Mexico 
COP 17/MOP 7  28 Nov.-9 Dec. 2011  Durban, South 
Africa 
EU foreign policy implementation  
As the European Community had no formal status in the INC, it would become de facto 
represented  by  the  Council  Presidency,  which  also  made  efforts  to  coordinate  activities 
among all member states, arguably achieving a certain degree of uniform representation of the 
Union‟s positions (Brambilla 2004: 165). Despite these coordination efforts, each member 
state  also  had  its  own  representations  in  the  INC  process,  however.  In  the  absence  of  a 
common negotiation strategy, the EU‟s joint actions would thus often be of an ad hoc nature, 
and individual member states assumed significant responsibilities. Following a period during 
which  the  EU  attempted  to  convince  the  US  of  changing  course  by  arguing  for  its  own 
position, it finally engaged in bargaining when, in April 1992, the UK Environment Secretary 
negotiated bilaterally with US State Department officials on key compromise text concerning 
the objectives of the future regime, which later made it virtually unchanged into Article 4.2 
UNFCCC, cited above (Bodansky 1993, 491). This British initiative had enjoyed the support 
from some EU members, but had not been based on any formal EC mandate to compromise 
on its target objectives (Lescher 2000, 61). Yet, “without the machinery provided by the EC EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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for discussion between ministers [the UK-US deal] may not have happened” (Haigh 1996, 
181-182).  
In synthesis, the EU can thus be characterized as an ad hoc negotiation participant in the early 
days of global climate politics: based on a general common position and basic coordination 
mechanisms, it assured a minimum degree of common, albeit often improvised representation 
through its most active members.  
2.2.  Consolidating the UN climate regime: Coordinated EU bargaining  
for ambitious reduction targets (1993-1997) 
In the period between the adoption of the Convention and its entry into force in 1994, parties 
identified the need for reinforcing the soft legal framework provided by the UNFCCC. To 
negotiate a new legal instrument, the 1995 first conference of the parties created the Ad Hoc 
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), whose work would result in the Kyoto Protocol in 
late 1997. 
EU foreign policy making and global climate politics 
The internal institutional context for EU foreign climate policy was modified in October 1994 
when the Environment Council created an ad hoc working group of national climate experts 
and  charged  it  with  the  task  of  mediating  between  EU  members  in  order  to  prepare the 
Union‟s negotiation position for COP 1 (Lescher 2000: 72). Early EU proposals in the AGBM 
process drafted in this group concentrated on the regulatory approach of the regime, for which 
the Union  favoured a command-and-control  framework based on  “policies and  measures” 
(AGBM  1995:  37-53).  Gradually,  the  EU  also  introduced  the  aim  of  limiting  global 
temperature rise to 2°C into its policy proposals (Council 1996). Finally, in the spring of 
1997, the  Dutch  EU  Presidency  managed  to  forge  a  deal  on  the  main  component  of  the 
Union‟s position: the objective of jointly reducing emissions by 15% until 2010 (Kanie 2003). 
Although member states were only able to share the burden for reductions of about two thirds 
of  these  15%,  this  proactive  proposal  would  become  the  cornerstone  of  the  Union‟s 
negotiation position during the final phases of the talks. 
The external political context in which the EU defended these positions had slightly altered 
since the negotiations on the Convention. While the G-77/China continued its activities as a 
block, a major novel negotiating coalition of non-EU industrialized countries had formed: 
JUS(S)CA(N)NZ  (Japan,  United  States,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  later  with 
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) (Grubb et al. 2001). Key issues in the global negotiations 
concerned the magnitude of reduction targets for industrialized countries and the regulatory 
approach of the reformed regime. While the US would, as of 1996, become more open toward 
concluding a legally binding agreement, it coupled its acceptance of this to clear-cut demands 
regarding  market-based,  flexible  mechanisms  as  prime  instruments  for reducing emissions 
(Yamin 2000). This position, mostly supported by other JUSSCANNZ members, but also the EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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much less ambitious emission reduction target proposals advanced by the US (stabilization at 
1990 levels over the period 2008-2012) and Japan (5% reductions by 2010) would stand in 
stark  contrast  to  the  preferences  of  the  EU  and  the  G-77/China,  both  advocating  15% 
reductions by developed countries by 2010 as well as command-and-control measures (Grubb 
et al. 2001). In the decisive stages of the talks, the three major industrialized emitters, COP 3 
host Japan, the US and the EU bargained for a compromise that foresaw reductions from 1990 
levels of 6, 7 and 8% respectively over the period 2008-2012 and the introduction of a range 
of flexible mechanisms (Oberthür/Ott 1999). 
EU foreign policy implementation  
As a regional economic integration organisation (REIO), the EC was endowed with all the 
rights  of  a  full  member  during  the  UNFCCC  COPs  (Lescher  2000:  73).  In  practice,  the 
Council Presidency would exercise these rights on the EC‟s behalf, assisted by other members 
of  the  Troika  (including  the  former  and  future  presidencies).  It  represented  the  Union‟s 
positions in the first place by submitting a series of formal policy proposals to the UNFCCC 
secretariat, all of them aimed at setting the agenda of the global talks. In early 1997, the 
Union would shift from such a content- and arguing-based defence of its proposed regulatory 
approach to focus on joint bargaining on the basis of its 15% target proposal. With this, it 
managed to rally the developing country block behind its target proposal. Yet, its exclusive 
focus on the magnitude of the emission reduction objectives and a high degree of inflexibility 
of its positions - necessitating substantial coordination meetings to the detriment of foreign 
policy activity - meant that it would lose out on almost all items besides the target during the 
final  deal-making  in  Kyoto  (Yamin  2000:  61).  Although  the  strong  defence  of  its  target 
proposal arguably pulled the US and Japan toward higher reduction pledges, the Union had to 
sacrifice  other  previously  defended  positions,  notably  regarding  its  preferences  for  the 
regulatory approach of the future regime. 
In sum, the EU developed into - and was recognized as - a more uniform foreign policy player 
during this period, based on its desire to lead the negotiation process and its early positioning 
around  “policies  and  measures”  as  well  as  its  target  proposal.  Its  foreign  policy 
implementation, by contrast, remained fairly limited: it relied almost exclusively on the tools 
of conference diplomacy, and thus essentially on the appeal of its proposals. In the decisive 
talks,  the  inflexibility  of  its  positions  implied,  however,  a  substantive  need  to  coordinate 
internally, which hampered common EU outreach. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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2.3.  Maintaining the UN climate regime: Reinforced EU diplomatic activity  
to assure the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (1998-2004) 
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was not obtained until 2004, and the EU would come to 
play a special role in the processes leading up to it. 
EU foreign policy making and global climate politics 
Soon after the Kyoto COP, the EU began to engage in the construction of a regional climate 
regime, centred on the creation of a European Emissions Trading System (ETS), which was 
intended to prepare the Union for a swift ratification of the Protocol, setting the example for 
other industrialized parties (Pallemaerts 2004: 44-48). In the global negotiations, it defended 
above all an environmentally sound operationalization of the flexible mechanisms (including 
a  demand  for  “supplementarity”,  i.e.  the  definition  of  a  cap  on  non-domestic  measures 
counting towards the fulfilment of a party‟s Kyoto target) and a strong compliance system 
(Grubb/Yamin 2001). 
The  need  to  operationalize  many  of  the  provisions  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  notably  those 
regarding  the  flexible  mechanisms,  in  order  to  prepare  for  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
dominated the negotiation agenda until 2000 and COP 6 in The Hague, which broke down 
over EU-US differences regarding precisely the question of flexibility (Grubb/Yamin 2001). 
In  March  2001,  the  George  W.  Bush  administration  then  completely  withdrew  from  the 
ratification process, considerably empowering the remaining key members of the Umbrella 
group  (former  JUSSCANNZ+Russia,  Ukraine),  as  each  one  of  them  was  now  needed  to 
obtain the ratification of the Protocol.
5 Intensified exchanges between the EU and these other 
key players in the immediate aftermath of US disengagement resulted in a joint commitment 
to  continue  with  the  operationa lization  process.  This  process   was  concluded  with  the 
“Marrakech  Accords” adopted in  late 2001.  In the  negotiations  leading to these  Accords, 
countries  like  Japan  or  Russia  managed  to  exploit  their  new  bargaining  power  to  obtain 
numerous concessions from the EU, mostly with regard to the use of flexibility provisions. It 
took another three years to convince Russia to ratify the treaty (Douma 2006).  
EU foreign policy implementation  
Following from the perception that the EU had under-performed at the summit in The Hague, 
its  foreign  policy  implementation  set-up  was  reformed.  As  of  late  2000,  a  novel  Troika, 
consisting of the present and future Council Presidencies and the Commission represented the 
Union  externally  on  climate  change  (Grubb  2001:  10).  In  2004,  after  further  episodes  of 
                                                 
 
5 For the Protocol to take force, its Article 25.1 foresaw the approval of 55 parties to the UNFCCC, including 
industrialized country parties representing 55% of the total emissions of all industrialized parties. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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unsatisfactory outreach activity, a completely new system of representation was then put into 
place. Individuals from any member state or the Commission would be  designated as EU 
“lead negotiators” on specific topics and for longer periods of time (Oberthür/Roche Kelly 
2008: 38). Further, “issue leaders” were nominated, who formed small groups that would join 
the  lead  negotiators  in  designing  and  promoting  EU  positions.  This  was  done  in  close 
cooperation with the expert groups that had developed within the working group structure 
under the Environment Council, which had in the meantime evolved into the Working Party 
on International Environmental Issues - Climate Change (WPIEI-CC) (Oberthür/Roche Kelly 
2008: 38). 
In the global negotiations, these EU representatives initially strongly advocated the Union‟s 
ideal vision of the environmental integrity of the Protocol. An intra-EU quarrel between the 
French  EU  presidency  and  the  UK  contributed,  however,  to  the  abovementioned  open 
confrontation  with  the  US  at  COP  6.  Following  the  failure  of  this  summit,  the  Union‟s 
approach would completely change: in an effort to save the Protocol, the EU started a tour to 
the capitals of key industrialized and developing countries, engaging - for the first time since 
the inception of the climate regime - in very active diplomatic lobbying for the continued 
ratification of the treaty (Grubb 2001). Where other parties were quickly convinced to pursue 
the  ratification  procedure,  this  came  at  the  high  price  of  considerable  EU  concessions 
regarding  the  environmental  integrity  of  the  Protocol  at  Marrakech.  Moreover,  Russia 
continued to exploit the bargaining leverage provided by its pending ratification. To assure 
ratification in the Duma, the EU negotiated an extension of the 1997 EU-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement, which was to clear the path for the country‟s membership bid to 
the World Trade Organization, a quest the Union equally promised to support (Douma 2006: 
61).  
Altogether, the  EU  consolidated  its  decision-making  and  representation  system  through  a 
reform that - formally - enabled constant coordination and consistent outreach through the 
same experts during this period. At the same time, its foreign policy implementation remained 
the expression of its overarching desire to lead the global negotiation process. 
2.4. Post-2012 reform efforts in the UN climate regime: The EU on its way  
to becoming a fully-fledged diplomatic actor (2005-2009) 
Following  the  ratification  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  the  climate  regime  underwent  renewed 
reform efforts. 
EU foreign policy making and global climate politics 
To prepare for the post-2012 negotiations, the EU would formulate a position on the basis of 
its long-standing 2°C target very early in the global negotiation process. In January 2007, the 
European  Commission  proposed  that  industrialized  parties,  including  the  Union,  should 
reduce their emissions by 30% from 1990 levels until 2020 and that “the EU should already EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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now take on a firm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of GHG 
emissions  by  2020  (…)  This  approach  will  allow  the  EU  to  demonstrate  international 
leadership on climate issues” (European Commission 2007b, 2). Driven by exactly this desire 
of leading the international negotiations, the European Council endorsed the 20%/30% target 
proposal  in  March  2007  and  invited  the  Commission  to  suggest  comprehensive  climate 
legislation,  including  a  reform  of  the  ETS  (European  Council  2007;  Vogler  2008).  The 
climate and energy package it proposed in 2008 was then negotiated within a year‟s time to 
prepare the Union for what it hoped to be the decisive round of negotiations for a new, legally 
binding global climate treaty in 2009 (Oberthür 2009).  
As global climate politics moved up on the agendas of leaders across the globe in the late 
2000s,  it  also  diversified  considerably.  Efforts  to  (re-)engage  the  US  and/or  the  major 
emerging countries were undertaken via the G-8(+5), the Major Economies Meeting/Forum 
(MEF) and the G-20. In 2007, the COP  finally also adopted the “Bali  Roadmap”, which 
foresaw reform debates under two tracks within the UN climate regime: an Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties (AWG-KP) and another one on long-term 
cooperative action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), also involving the US (ENB 2007). 
Key  cleavages  in  the  unfolding  post-2012  debates,  opposing  essentially  the  US  and  the 
developing countries, would revolve around the questions of  who (industrialized countries 
only, as the majority of the G-77/China wished, or also emerging economies) was to do what 
and  how  much  in  terms  of  emission  cuts  (commitments  to  emission  reduction  targets,  as 
desired and stipulated by the industrialized world, vs. to actions, as proposed by developing 
countries) and who would pay for these reductions. Moreover, disagreements arose on the 
legal form of the outcome (an “Implementing Agreement”, as the US wanted, one treaty, as 
the EU preferred, or a new treaty plus a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which was the suggestion many developing countries supported). Despite a proliferation of 
arenas and encounters, parties were incapable of meeting their self-set deadline: COP 15 in 
Copenhagen delivered no comprehensive regime reform, but only a loose political agreement, 
into which all parties could  inscribe pledges  for emission reduction targets (industrialized 
countries)  or  actions  (developing  countries)  (UNFCCC  2009).  The  provisions  of  the 
“Copenhagen Accord” were formalized a year later at COP 16 in the “Cancun Agreements” 
(UNFCCC 2010). 
EU foreign policy implementation 
The  Union‟s  foreign  policy  implementation  during  this  period  consisted  essentially  of  a 
pursuit of the previously employed “leading-by-example” approach, which was enhanced in 
several respects. First, the Union employed a novel set of foreign policy tools to invite the 
emerging  economies  to  the  negotiation  table,  notably  by  concluding  climate  and  energy 
partnerships with China and India, which it hoped would forge political dialogue on the post-
2012 regime reform. Second, the EU also began to operate increasingly through its diplomatic 
network of Commission delegations and diplomatic  missions  in key capitals to spread its 
climate policy messages more widely. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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Once the new negotiation process was almost set on rails, the Union sought to make a mark as 
the  first  major  party  to  table  substantial  proposals  on  various  components  of  the  future 
regime. The key element of its approach was the 20/30% target proposal. In contrast to the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the EU would bolster its 20% reduction proposal by internal 
legislation during 2007/2008, outlining how it was to achieve these cuts.  
With its substantive proposals oriented at problem-solving, the Union was unable to react 
flexibly to the continued reluctance of other players to decisively engage on global climate 
policies  in  the  final  stages  of  the  talks.  Given  the  increased  importance  of  the  emerging 
economies, the negligence of forging a joint strategic approach beyond the mere diplomatic 
defence  of  long-standing  positions  arguably  cost  the  EU  greater  leverage  over  the  2009 
Copenhagen  Accord  and  its  follow-up  process.  Both  were  dominated  by  the  strategic 
interactions  of  the  US  and  the  newly  formed  BASIC  group  (Brazil,  South  Africa,  India, 
China) (Müller 2010).  
In synthesis, while the EU may institutionally have been on the way toward a fully-fledged 
diplomatic player in the post-2012 negotiations, its foreign policy implementation continued 
to suffer from severe flexibility constraints. 
3.  Explaining the evolution of EU foreign climate policy:  
A case of bounded adaptiveness 
After briefly extracting patterns of continuity and change from the narrative process-trace, the 
evolution  of  the  EU‟s  foreign  climate  policy  making  and  implementation  since  the  early 
1990s - as the key dependent variable of this undertaking - is explained with the help of the 
middle-range theoretical approaches to EU integration processes outlined earlier. 
3.1.  Extracting patterns 
The historical evolution of the Union‟s foreign climate policy is characterized by significant 
changes in its capacity to be a foreign policy actor and, given the major transformations in the 
global context, remarkable  long-term continuities regarding  its  foreign policy  making and 
implementation.  
The empirical analysis suggests that the Union developed considerably as a foreign policy 
player on climate change in institutional terms: in the early 1990s, it had been an ad hoc 
negotiation  participant  in  global  climate  talks,  which  was  very  much  dependent  on  the 
willingness of its member states to represent EU positions. Following the Maastricht Treaty, it 
developed into a more uniform diplomatic actor, which could rely on a sophisticated decision-
making machinery in the working party system under the Environment Council as well as on 
more elaborate representation mechanisms. In the 2000s then, the EU‟s foreign climate policy 
capacity  was  further  consolidated  through  an  arrangement  involving  lead  negotiators  and EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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issue leaders, which assured the continuity of its internal decision-making and improved that 
of its external representation by regularizing exchanges with third parties. 
Yet, these integration efforts, resulting in expanded capacities as a foreign policy player, did 
not coincide with substantial changes in its foreign policy making. Once the working party 
structure under the Environment Council had been put into place in 1994, the aspiration to 
lead global climate policy making by setting the example via ambitious policy and emission 
reduction proposals became the Union‟s uncontested leitmotif. Ever since, this position has 
been  consolidated  and  selectively  complemented,  but  remained  overall  unaltered  and 
unchallenged.  
It  was  this  position  that  also  strongly  co-determined  the  Union‟s  foreign  climate  policy 
implementation over (at least) the past 15 years. Rather than forging foreign policy positions 
and subsequently considering how to best attain the underlying objectives in the face of the 
evolving, concrete institutional and political parameters of the global context, including other 
players‟ preferences, the EU proactively tabled an endless stream of policy proposals. These 
regularly emanated from its regional climate regime and were primarily based on internal 
policy  considerations.  Foreign  policy  positioning  thus  became  synonymous  with  foreign 
policy implementation. Selective extensions of this approach concerned the Union‟s expanded 
outreach activities, e.g. to the emerging economies, and a broader use of its foreign policy 
tools in the mid-2000s, but remained overall limited. 
3.2.  Explaining the evolution of the EU’s foreign climate policy 
This  asymmetrical  development  pattern  -  with  an  almost  linear  evolution  of  the  Union‟s 
formal foreign policy capacity, long-term positional stability and a fairly embryonic foreign 
policy implementation - requires a two-step explanation. The findings strongly suggest that 
the EU‟s foreign policy implementation is not just intertwined with, but represents a direct 
function  of  its  position.  Explaining  its  foreign  climate  policy  evolution  therefore  firstly 
necessitates a concise account of how its position was brought about. Subsequently, the fact 
that its foreign policy implementation remained rather limited despite the Union‟s capacity to 
repeatedly adopt (the same type of) ambitious common positions needs to be accounted for. 
The  explanation  draws  on  the  three  strands  of  neo-institutionalist  EU  integration  theory 
presented earlier, while taking  into account the impact of external  factors on the Union‟s 
foreign policy behaviour. 
To explain the genesis and development of its long-standing leading-by-example position, one 
can firstly draw on the existing literature on EU external climate policy. From the early 1990s 
on, the Union‟s position-building was strongly informed by the normative desire to lead in 
global environmental politics, formulated in the 1990 Dublin European Council conclusions 
(Vogler  2008;  Costa  2009a;  Van  Schaik/Schunz  2012).  Following  the  loose  intra-EU 
coordination during the first global climate negotiations, a body for canalizing its climate 
policy aspirations was created in 1994 with the working group of climate experts, which later EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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developed into the WPIEI-CC as it exists today. In this body, socialization processes resulted 
over  time  in  the  emergence  of  a  small  group  of  policy-makers  from  the  member  states‟ 
Environment  Ministries  and  the  Commission‟s  DG  Environment  (Costa  2009a).  Over  the 
years,  this  “highly  specialized  alliance”  not  only  demonstrated  that  it  was  capable  of 
preparing common EU positions, but also reinforced its keen desire of “making the EU the 
leader  in  international  climate  negotiations”  (Costa  2009a:  139-140).  When  the  Union‟s 
proposals on “policies and measures” had not delivered any major advances during the global 
talks in 1995/6, early 1997 provided the window of opportunity for this group to help forge 
decisions  that  could  leave  a  mark  on  the  UN  negotiations,  as  “there  was  clearly  both  a 
requirement and a major opportunity for EU leadership” in the AGBM debates at that stage 
(Vogler 2008: 10). Together with other progressive member states and the Commission‟s DG 
Environment - and supported by environmental NGOs -, the Dutch EU Presidency took the 
initiative to forge the discussed agreement on the Union‟s 15% emission reduction target, 
which responded perfectly to the desire to lead through ambitious proposals (Vogler 2008; 
Kanie 2003).  
From an integration theory perspective, the original rationale behind the Union‟s decision to 
adopt  this  particular  joint  position  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol  talks  can  thus  essentially  be 
explained with sociological institutionalist arguments (Risse 2009). The position was strongly 
influenced  by  a  small  group  of  policy  entrepreneurs  within  the  EU  that  had  gradually 
socialized and developed into a powerful alliance in favour of strong EU external climate 
performance. This group took its decisions on the  basis of shared  values: a  “real overall 
reduction was  accepted as the  necessary  basis  for climate  leadership” (Vogler 2008: 14), 
which, in turn, was regarded as an opportunity to solve the problem of climate change in line 
with the precautionary principle, while boosting the Union‟s role as a global player (Van 
Schaik/Schunz 2012). Where the target proposal became the key component of the Union‟s 
position, the logic of front-running it embodied extended also to many other of its policy 
proposals, such as those on policies and measures.  
Once the leading-by-example position had been adopted, a form of “norm entrapment” set in: 
resulting from agency by the WPIEI-CC as a collective “norm entrepreneur” of sorts, this 
position became an “uncontested normative frame” in the relevant policy circles and civil 
ociety (Vogler 2008: 25; Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007;).
6 By consequence, the relative failure of 
                                                 
 
6  A  similar  argument  about  green  entrepreneurs  is  made  by  Kelemen  and  Vogel  (2010:  438-444)  in  their 
explanation of why the US and the EU “traded places” in leading international environmental politics in the 
recent  past.  Green  domestic  groups  pushing  for  leadership  represent  one  important  component  of  their 
explanation  for  the  EU  case,  the  other  aspect  relates  to  “how  such  [international]  agreements  affect  the 
competitive position of domestic producers” (Kelemen/Vogel 2010: 444). In short, Kelemen/Vogel argue that 
there is a strong incentive for the EU to externalize its high standards resulting from internal political pressures 
from green actors (2010). By  fully embracing a rational choice approach, this explanation fails to understand 
why the EU adopts the specific approach of leading by example, which has proven to be durably unsuccessful. If 
the Union desperately needed to export its standards, other foreign policy strategies, such as those expanded 
upon in the conclusion of this article, could have been pursued.  EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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the EU‟s foreign policy at the Kyoto COP - where it had sacrificed its regulatory approach for 
the adoption of (prima facie) comparatively ambitious emission reduction targets which were 
subsequently watered down through the many derogations foreseen in the Marrakech Accords 
- did not lead to a change of position. Quite to the contrary, leading by example was even 
reinforced in the early to mid-2000s, as the EU began to use its external climate policies  
explicitly  to  construct  its  identity  as  a  global  player,  notably  vis-à-vis  the  reluctant  US 
government (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 447-448). Sociological  and historical  institutionalist 
reasoning can thus explain the pursuit of this position, which did not lead to a very effective 
foreign  policy  implementation  during  the  period  1998  to  2005:  while  the  EU  arguably 
contributed strongly to the maintenance of the multilateral regime via the operationalization 
and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, it had to sacrifice its environmental integrity concerns 
in the process, as illustrated by the negotiations on the Marrakech Accords. 
The further adherence to this position in the post-2012 debate can then best be captured by the 
notion  of  path-dependency  (Pierson  2000):  by  the  mid-2000s,  the  leading-by-example 
approach to global climate politics had become “locked in” as the central point of reference 
within the EU. Actors in the WPIEI-CC, but also at higher political levels - right to the top of 
member state governments - had embraced the leadership discourse so strongly, believing the 
majority of civil society and the public behind them (Eurobarometer 2008), that they could 
only have sacrificed this position and the corresponding approach at a very high cost. At the 
height of the global climate debates during the period 2007 to 2009, key EU leaders did not 
collectively consider modifying an approach that was not delivering results, as none of them 
wanted to risk a loss of credibility vis-à-vis international negotiation partners, among EU civil 
society or with national constituencies. As a result - and despite initially critical voices from 
the Commission‟s DG Trade and some member states in the mid-2000s -, the Union adopted 
in 2007 a position that was very similar to the one it had defended during the Kyoto talks. At 
its heart lay the target proposal, embedded into a package of proactive policy proposals, now 
centered on the instrument of emissions trading (Vogler 2008: 22, 25).  
It was this long-standing position, in turn, that strongly co-determined the Union‟s foreign 
policy  implementation  of  the  past  15  years.  The  gradual  institutionalization  of  external 
climate policy making in a group of climate experts in the WPIEI-CC, which resulted from 
the desire to give the Union‟s leadership ambition the necessary institutional underpinning, 
brought  with  it  a  default  preference  for  proactively  suggesting  technical  solutions  to  the 
problems  associated  with  climate  change  to  the  wider  world.  Adopting  such  ambitious 
positions and positing these as a model for others became thus the uncontested EU foreign 
policy strategy. Pursuing such an approach testifies to a high confidence in the attractiveness 
of  one‟s  model.  It  results  from  a  foreign  policy  making  process  in  which  strategic 
considerations taking into account the external context play a much less significant role than 
internal, technical concerns. As the EU regularly defines its positions very early in the global 
negotiation  process,  they  comprise  an  ideal-typical,  often  science-based  view  of  how  it 
envisages the future of the global climate regime. In the further course of global talks, the 
negotiation  context  is  then  primarily  regarded  through  the  prism  of  this  position,  which EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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frequently results in high degrees of inflexibility of the EU‟s foreign policy implementation. 
Just like the perpetuation of its leading-by-example positions, the EU‟s strategy can thus in 
the first instance be explained by a form of “norm entrapment”: internal restraints resulting 
from the normative desire to lead left a narrow margin of manoeuvre. 
How then, can we explain the few, but significant instances in which the Union‟s foreign 
policy implementation deviated from well-trodden paths? The two key examples of this could 
be  detected  in  the  first  half  of  the  2000s.  Following  the  US  withdrawal  from  the  Kyoto 
Protocol ratification process, subsequent attempts to create alternative governance fora and 
Russia‟s  ratification  delay,  the  EU  momentarily  stepped  up  its  diplomatic  efforts  and 
employed a wider range of - also economic - foreign policy instruments to protect its core 
objective (the maintenance of the multilateral regime). In similar vein, it reacted to the more 
complex climate governance structures and trends by widening the scope of its foreign policy 
activities and forging bilateral energy partnerships during the post-2012 negotiations.  
If the EU did display signs of a limited reactive capacity to the evolving external context in its 
foreign policy implementation, the form its reactions took was determined by the overarching 
logic of its leadership approach. Reactions were either - defensively - meant to safeguard this 
approach  or  -  aggressively  -  to  disperse  key  EU  messages  more  widely.  In  both  cases, 
modifications  of  its  foreign  climate  policy  implementation  represented  adaptations  to  the 
external  environment  that  were  restrained  by  internal  considerations.  Path-dependency  
arguments invoking a strongly “bounded” adaptiveness on the part of the EU (Pierson 2001: 
415), already used to explain the continuity of its foreign climate policy decision-making, 
seem therefore best suited to also capture the evolutionary logic of its foreign climate policy 
implementation  from  the  mid-1990s  to  at  least  the  2009  Copenhagen  summit  and  its 
aftermath. 
Conclusion 
This  contribution  explored  how  the  European  Union‟s  foreign  policy  on  climate  change 
developed over the past two decades, and explained this development  with the  help of  a 
combination of mid-range theories of EU integration.  
A longitudinal case study embodying a narrative process-trace of the EU‟s foreign climate 
policy evolution since the early 1990s revealed three key trends: an incremental improvement 
of its formal foreign policy capacity stood in stark contrast to a largely unaltered leading-by-
example  position  coupled  to  limited  and  inflexible  foreign  policy  implementation.  This 
pattern  can  plausibly  be  explained  through  a  combination  of  sociological  and  historical 
institutionalist arguments. At the outset stood the Union‟s strong normative desire to lead 
global  climate  politics,  which  can  be  traced  back  to  the  1990  Dublin  European  Council 
conclusions. This desire and the relative  failure to act coherently  during the talks on the 
UNFCCC  led to the creation of a  Working Party under the Environment Council, which 
would quickly turn into the power house for the continuous and proactive design of ambitious EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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EU climate policy positions. As a “norm entrepreneur” of sorts, its main self-set objective was 
to prepare the Union for “leadership by example”, an approach which would become “locked 
in” de facto and in the EU‟s discourse ever since the mid-1990s. As a result, the Union‟s 
external behaviour habitually limited itself to explaining its model, to the point that foreign 
policy positioning would gradually become synonymous of foreign policy implementation, 
which is a first finding of this analysis meriting special emphasis. Only on rare occasions did 
the EU adapt its foreign policy activities to react to the external environment. These limited 
adjustments remained however largely bounded by internal considerations and the desire to 
safeguard its overarching approach. At no point did the EU endow itself with a real foreign 
climate policy implementation strategy including fall-back positions.  
These findings generated through a longitudinal case study and based on pattern-matching 
involving a combination of EU integration theories coincide, as demonstrated, to some extent 
with the insights provided in the literature for specific time periods of EU engagement in 
global climate politics, notably when it comes to understanding its foreign policy making. The 
unravelling  of  the  long-term  logic  and  the  extension  of  the  analysis  to  foreign  policy 
implementation provides however for a novel perspective that challenges (i) the customary 
understanding of EU climate leadership in the academic literature and (ii), importantly, the 
policy rationale of the Union‟s approach to global climate policy-making tout court.  
First, in the academic debate on EU climate leadership, the dominant idea is that the Union 
represents  an  almost  natural  “green  leader”,  with  a  vested  interest  in  exporting  its  high 
internal standards. While this interpretation may account for the motivation of some of those 
involved in forging EU positions in this area at certain moments in time, it falls, for several 
reasons, short of explaining the real evolution of EU external climate policy. To begin with, it 
is unable to explain the exact shape of EU leadership, its leading-by-example approach. Why 
did  the  EU  not  adopt  a  more  active  approach  that  transcends  the  simple  positing  and 
explaining of its own model? What is more, studies based on the leadership concept are not 
suited for understanding why the EU clenched to its leadership-by-example approach despite 
the ineffectiveness of the latter, which was apparent at least since the aftermath of the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations in the late 1990s. Again, if exporting its model was so important to the 
EU, why did it content itself with the ineffective explanation of this approach for such a long 
time? If one follows the arguments presented in this contribution, the concept of leadership 
employed in the academic debate on the Union´s foreign climate policy underestimates the 
role of norms, ideas and institutions in the design of this latter. Based on a set of ideas and 
values related to precautionary action and the EU´s self-image as a benign, civilian power in 
the world, the Union‟s foreign climate policy was set on certain paths that it was unable to 
leave, even in the face of growing ineffectiveness. These institutional factors, and notably the 
notion  of  path-dependency,  also  hold  explanatory  power  for  the  Union‟s  suboptimal 
performance during most of the past global climate negotiations.  
This  brings us to the second point and the rationale of adopting a  leadership-by-example 
approach from the perspectives of EU and member state policy-makers. In the eyes of many 
of its advocates, leading by example was the best possible option the EU possessed. Even EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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after its underperformance at the Copenhagen summit, many policy-makers, scholars and civil 
society  representatives  continued  to  argue  that  this  approach  would  remain  valid  and  be 
successful, if only the EU was given more time (Wurzel/Connelly 2010: 286-287). Yet, time 
is, if recent findings of climate scientists summarized in reports by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change are taken at face value, a scarce resource in global climate politics. 
Against this  backdrop, an approach that does not advance the  state of the global  climate 
(negotiations), but also hinders progress in the EU, besides damaging its image as a foreign 
policy player, is problematic. While the findings presented in this contribution explain why 
policy-makers perpetuated the Union‟s leadership approach, it can also account for why this 
approach has been ineffective. On the one hand, it largely ignores evolutions in the global 
context, limiting itself to an exercise of introspection and externalization of internal policy 
choices. On the other hand, the one path consistently pursued by EU policy-makers rendered a 
serious  engagement  with  alternative  strategies  rather  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  Yet,  the 
empirical evidence presented in this paper, which is in large parts based on interviews with 
EU  negotiators,  suggests  that  the  Union  did  have,  at  different  points  in  time,  alternative 
behavioural  paths  at  its  disposal.  In  the  mid-2000s,  for  instance,  some  member  states 
proposed to take a more cautious, wait-and-see attitude to global climate talks, but key policy 
entrepreneurs pushed for the front-running leadership-by-example approach in the post-2012 
negotiations until the Copenhagen summit. In these talks, strong coalition-building, e.g. with 
developing countries or the relatively progressive Annex I countries (Japan, Australia) and 
Russia,  but also a  more assertive defence of  its objectives (see the  ongoing debate about 
climate-related  border  measures:  Gros/Egenhofer  2010)  would  have  been  (and  still  are) 
alternatives.  Yet,  the  technical-managerial  approach  dominated  over  a  more  political  and 
strategic one based on foreign policy considerations, which the EU may however not be able 
to avoid in the future, if it still wants to count in the global debates on this topic (Geden 2011: 
22).  
In sum, the longitudinal approach taken in this analysis reveals thus that, even after 20 years 
of participation in the field, the Union has not yet developed into a fully mature foreign policy 
actor  on  climate  change.  Foreign  policy  implementation  indeed  appears  to  represent  a 
boundary of European integration, at least in this field. Yet, in contrast to what rationalists 
would assume, namely that states‟ desire for preserving their prerogatives hinders integration, 
the Union‟s norm-driven behaviour and its overall neglect for “the strategic” stands in the 
way  of  greater  integration  efforts.  As  “strategy  is  ultimately  about  effectively  exercising 
power” (Foster, cited in Baylis et al. 2007: 5), the EU‟s maturation as an actor seems to hinge 
on its capacity to overcome this strategic reluctance. If it wants to compensate for the overall 
loss of clout it suffers due to relatively decreasing emissions in the global climate arena, it 
needs to empower itself to act more strategically in the future. While it chose to keep a low 
profile at COP 16 in Cancun in 2010, COP 17 in 2011 witnessed an EU that “drafted the 
script for the central plot in Durban by setting out [its] stall early in the process and offering 
to do the heavy lifting to save the Kyoto Protocol within the context of a roadmap that put up 
a challenge to other parties” (ENB 2011: 29). The Union defended thus essentially a position 
aimed at preserving its leadership: instead of 2009, its original deadline for concluding an EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
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agreement (to take effect in 2013), it now argued for the conclusion of a new, encompassing 
agreement by 2015 (to take effect in 2020), and for filling the policy gap until then through a 
second  commitment  period  for  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  In  implementing  this  foreign  policy 
position, it employed at least some more wide-reaching foreign policy tools transcending the 
leadership-by-example approach, however, notably by fostering a coalition with the small-
island states and the LDCs to put pressure on the emerging economies (Morales 2011). While 
this was certainly a more pragmatic stance than during past global climate talks, it is too early 
to tell if this represented first signs of a durable modification of its overall approach to global 
climate  politics.  In  any  case,  if  the  Copenhagen  summit  may  have  represented  a  critical 
juncture for its foreign climate policy, the inertia of the leadership approach - in addition to 
struggles about the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - are apparently so strong that any 
adaptation takes a longer time than the EU and the global climate can afford.  
Although any attempt at generalizing from a single case study needs to be undertaken with a 
great degree of caution, the climate domain is often cited - not the least by policy-makers 
themselves - as a potential precedent for other cases of EU foreign policy outside the realm of 
the CFSP. It represents a policy area in which the EU has invested ample resources, which is 
of great importance to it, and which can be regarded as a prototypical case of an issue in 
which the boundary between internal and external policies is blurred. As such, it qualifies as a 
pronounced  example  of  a  whole  set  of  similar  EU  external  policies,  especially  in  the 
environmental  area.  By  way  of  analogical  reasoning,  one  can  assume  that  also  in  these 
domains the maturation of the EU as a foreign policy player will be limited by its focus on 
introspective  foreign  policy  making  and  reluctance  for  strategic  implementation  of  its 
positions, rooted in historically grown institutional dynamics within the Union (Van Schaik 
2011).  Mid-range  EU  integration  theories  can  thus  help  us  to  understand  the  limits  of 
European integration in the domain of EU foreign policy beyond the classical CFSP core. 
References 
Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate. 1995. Implementation of the Berlin Mandate. Note by 
the Secretariat. Addendum, available at http://doc.FCCC/AGBM/1995/Misc.1/Add.3, (last 
accessed on 2 November 2011). 
Aspinwall, M., and G. Schneider. 2000. Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist 
Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration.  European Journal of 
Political Research 38 (1): 1-36.  
Baylis, J., J. Wirtz, C.S. Gray, and E. Cohen. 2007. Strategy in the Contemporary World. 2
nd 
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bennett,  A.,  and  A.L.  George.  2005.  Case  studies  and  theory  development  in  the  social 
sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm      26 
 
Bodansky,  D.  1993.  The  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change:  A 
Commentary. Yale Journal of International Law 18 (2): 451-558.  
Brambilla,  P.  2004.  Europäisches  Umweltrecht  und  das  internationale  Klimaregime  der 
Vereinten Nationen. Ph.D. dissertation. Konstanz: Faculty of Law of the University of 
Konstanz. 
Brighi,  E.,  and  C. Hill.  2008. Implementation  and  behaviour.  In  Foreign  Policy. Theories, 
actors, cases, ed. S. Smith, A. Hadfield, and T. Dunne, 117-136. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Carlsnaes, W. 2007. European Foreign Policy. In Handbook of European Union Politics, ed. 
K.E. Jørgensen, M.A. Pollack, and B. Rosamond, London: Sag, 545-560. 
Checkel, J. T. 1999. Sanctions, Social Learning and Institutions: Explaining State Compliance 
with  Norms  of  the  European  Human  Rights  Regime.  Advanced  Research  on  the 
Europeanisation  of  the  Nation-State  (ARENA)  Working  Papers,  available  at 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/working 
papers/working-papers1999/wp99_11.htm.  
Clarke, M., and S. Smith. 1985. Conclusion. In Foreign Policy Implementation, ed. S. Smith, 
and M. Clarke, London: Allen and Unwin, 166-180. 
Costa, O. 2009a. Who decides EU foreign policy on climate change? In Climate Change and 
Foreign Policy. Case Studies From East to West, ed. P. Harris, London: Routledge, 134-
147. 
Costa,  O.  2009b.  Is  Climate  Change  Changing  the  EU?  The  Second  Image  Reversed  in 
Climate  Politics.  In  The  Politics  of  Climate  Change.  Environmental  Dynamics  in 
International Affairs, ed. P. Harris, London: Routledge, 72-89. 
Council of the EU. 1996. Environment Council. Press release 8518/96. Luxembourg. 25 June 
1996,  available  at  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/environment? 
target=2012&infotarget=before&max=105&bid=89&lang=en&id=  (last  accessed  on  17 
February 2012). 
Douma, W.T. 2006. The European Union, Russia and the Kyoto Protocol. In EU Climate 
Change  Policy:  The  Challenge  of  New  Regulatory  Initiatives,  ed.  M.  Peeters,  and  K. 
Deketelaere, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 51-68. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). 2007. Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of Parties to 
the UNFCCC and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 3-15 December 2007. 
Vol.  12  (354).  18  December.  New  York:  International  Institute  for  Sustainable 
Development. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm      27 
 
Earth  Negotiations  Bulletin  (ENB).  2011.  Summary  of  the  Durban  Climate  Change 
Conference: 28 November-11 December 2011. Vol. 12 (534). 13 December. New York: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Eurobarometer.  2008.  Europeans’  attitudes  towards  climate  change.  Special  Report  300. 
Brussels, September. 
European Council. 1990. Conclusions of the Presidency. Dublin. 25-26  June, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/dublin/du1_en.pdf (last accessed on 17 February 
2012). 
European  Council.  2007.  Presidency  Conclusions.  Brussels,  8-9  March,  available  at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224-re01.en07.pdf  (last  accessed  on 
17 February 2012). 
Garrison, J.A. 2003. Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium. International Studies 
Review 5 (1): 155-202. 
Geden,  O.  2011.  Das  Ende  der  Klimapolitik,  wie  wir  sie  kannten.  In  Ungeplant  ist  der 
Normalfall, ed. V. Perthes, and B. Lippert, Berlin: German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, 19-22. 
Gerring,  J.  2007.  Case  study  research.  Principles  and  Practice.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gros, D., and C. Egenhofer. 2010. Climate change and trade: taxing carbon at the border? 
Brussels: CEPS. 
Grubb, M. 2001. The UK and the European Union: Britannia Waives the Rules? In Climate 
Change After Marrakech: The Role of Europe in the Global Arena. German Foreign 
Policy in Dialogue, ed. D. Sprinz, In: Newsletter: German Foreign Policy in Dialogue 
Vol.2 (6), 9-12, available at http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue6.pdf. 
Grubb, M., and F. Yamin. 2001. Climatic Collapse at The Hague: What happened, why, and 
where do we go from here? International Affairs 77 (2): 261-276. 
Grubb, M., C. Vrolijk, and D. Brack. 2001. The Kyoto Protocol. A Guide and Assessment. 
London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
Gupta, J., and M. Grubb. 2000. Climate Change and European Leadership: A sustainable role 
for Europe? Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Gysen, J., H. Bruyninckx, and K. Bachus. 2006. The Modus Narrandi. A Methodology for 
Evaluating Effects of Environmental Policy. Evaluation 12 (1): 95-118. 
Haigh, N. 1996. Climate Change Policies and Politics in the European Community. In Politics 
of Climate Change. A European Perspective, ed. T. O‟Riordan, and J. Jäger, London: 
Routledge, 155-185. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm      28 
 
Hix, S., and B. Hoyland. 2011. The political system of the EU. 3
rd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hudson,  V.,  and  C.  Vore.  1995.  Foreign  policy  analysis  yesterday,  today  and  tomorrow. 
Mershon International Studies Review 39: 209-238.  
Jordan, A., and T. Rayner. 2010. The evolution of climate policy in the European Union: an 
historical overview. In Climate Change Policy in the European Union, ed. A. Jordan, D. 
Huitema, H. van Asselt, T. Rayner, and F. Berkhout, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 52-80. 
Jørgensen, K.E. 2007. The European Union and the World. In Handbook of European Union 
Politics, ed. K.E. Jørgensen, M.A. Pollack, and B. Rosamond, London: Sage. 
Kanie, N. 2003. Leadership in Multilateral Negotiation and Domestic Policy: The Netherlands 
at the Kyoto Protocol Negotiations. International Negotiation 8 (4): 339-365. 
Keukeleire,  S.,  and  J.  MacNaughtan.  2008.  The  Foreign  Policy  of  the  European  Union. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Kelemen, D., and D. Vogel. 2010. Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the 
European Union in International Environmental Politics. Comparative Political Studies 43 
(4): 427-456. 
Lescher, T.B. 2000. Die EU als eigenständiger Akteur in der Entstehung des internationalen 
Klimaregimes. Studien zur Deutschen und Europäischen Außenpolitik. Trier: Universität 
Trier. 
March, J.G., and J.P. Olsen. 1998. The institutional dynamics of international political orders. 
International Organization 52 (4): 943-969. 
Morales, A. 2011. EU to get tough in Durban climate talks. Bloomberg News. 29 November 
2011. 
Moravcsik, A. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht. Ithaka, N.Y.: UCL Press. 
Müller, B. 2010. Copenhagen 2009. Failure or final wake-up call for our leaders. Oxford: 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
Oberthür, S. 2009. The role of the EU in global environmental and climate governance. In 
The European Union and Global Governance, ed. M. Telo, London: Routledge, 192-209. 
Oberthür, S. and H.E. Ott. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol. International Climate Policy for the 21st 
Century. Berlin: Springer. 
Oberthür,  S.,  and  C.  Roche  Kelly.  2008.  EU  Leadership  in  International  Climate  Policy: 
Achievements and Challenges. The International Spectator 43 (3): 35-50. EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm      29 
 
Pallemaerts,  M.  2004.  Le  cadre  international  et européen  des  politiques  de  lutte  contre  les 
changements  climatiques.  Courrier  hébdomadaire  Vol.  2004  (1858-1859),  available  at 
http://www.cairn.info/revue-courrier-hebdomadaire-du-crisp-2004-33-page-1.htm. 
Paterson,  M.,  and  M.  Grubb.  1992.  The  International  Politics  of  Climate  Change. 
International Affairs 68 (2): 293-310. 
Pierson, P. 2000. Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics. American 
Political Science Review 94 (2): 251-267. 
Pierson, P. 2001. Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent 
Democracies. In The New Politics of the Welfare State, ed. P. Pierson, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 410-456. 
Pollack,  M.  2009.  The  New  Institutionalism  and  European  Integration.  In  European 
Integration Theory, 2
nd ed., ed. A. Wiener, and T. Diez, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
125-143. 
Risse, T. 2009. Social  Constructivism  and European Integration. In European Integration 
Theory, 2
nd ed., ed. A. Wiener, and T. Diez, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 144-160. 
Risse-Kappen, T. 1996. Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and 
Comparative  Policy  Analysis  Meet  the  European  Union.  Journal  of  Common  Market 
Studies (34) 1: 53-80. 
Sandholtz,  W.,  and  Stone  Sweet,  A.  eds.  1998.  European  Integration  and  Supranational 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scheipers,  S.,  and  D.  Sicurelli.  2007.  Normative  Power  Europe:  A  credible  Utopia?  In 
Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (2): 435-457. 
Schreurs,  M.,  and  Y.  Tiberghien.  2007.  Multi-Level  Reinforcement:  Explaining  European 
Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation. Global Environmental Politics 7 (4): 19-
46. 
Smith, K.E. 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Snyder, B., Bruck, H., and B. Sapin. 1962. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: an Approach to 
the Study of International Politics. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.  
Somers,  M.R.  1998.  “We‟re  No  Angels”:  Realism,  Rational  Choice,  and  Relationality  in 
Social Science. The American Journal of Sociology 104 (3): 722-784. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2009. Copenhagen 
Accord (doc. Decision -/CP.15). 19 December, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf (last accessed on 17 February 2012). EIoP     © 2012 by Simon Schunz 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-006a.htm      30 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2010. The Cancun 
Agreements  (docs.  Decision  1/CP.16,  1  and  2/CMP.6).  December,  available  at 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=%22cancun%
20agreements%22#beg (last accessed on 17 February 2012). 
Van  Schaik,  L.  2011.  Who  speaks  for  Europe?  The  battle  between  diplomats  and  policy 
experts.  Europe´s  World.  December  2011,  available  at  http://www.europesworld.org/ 
NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/2831/WhospeaksforEuropeTh
ebattlebetweendiplomatsandpolicyexperts.aspx (last accessed on 17 February 2012).  
Van Schaik, L., and S. Schunz. 2012. Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate 
Politics:  is  the  Union  a  Norm-  or Interest-Driven  Actor?  Journal  of  Common  Market 
Studies 50 (1): 169-186. 
Vogler,  J.  2008.  Climate  Change  and  EU  Foreign  Policy:  The  Negotiation  of  Burden-
Sharing. European Institute Working Paper, available at http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp_08-
11_john_vogler.pdf. 
Wiener, A., and T. Diez. 2009. Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In European 
Integration Theory, 2
nd ed., ed. A. Wiener, and T. Diez, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1-21. 
Wurzel,  R.,  and  J.  Connelly.  2010.  Conclusion:  the  European  Union‟s  leadership  role  in 
international  climate  politics  reassessed.  In  The  European  Union  as  a  Leader  in 
International  Climate  Change  Politics,  ed.  R.  Wurzel,  and  J.  Connelly,  London: 
Routledge, 271-290. 
Yamin, F. 2000. The role of the EU in climate negotiations. In Climate Change and European 
leadership:  A  sustainable  role  for  Europe,  ed.  J.  Gupta,  and  M.  Grubb,  Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 47-66. 
*Acknowledgments 
Research for this contribution was conducted under the KU Leuven Impuls project "The EU 
and multilateral governance" (2006-2010), and the author acknowledges the generous funding 
by  the  University  of  Leuven.  The  author  would  also  like  to  thank  the  three  anonymous 
reviewers for their very useful comments on earlier versions of this article. 